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Abstract
Some studies of unconscious cognition rely
on  judgments  of  participants  stating  that
they have “not seen” the critical  stimulus
(e.g.,  in  a  masked-priming  experiment).
Trials in which participants gave “not-seen”
judgments are then treated as those where
the  critical  stimulus  was  “subliminal”  or
“unconscious”,  as  opposed  to  trials  with
higher  visibility  ratings.  Sometimes,  only
these  trials  are  further  analyzed,  for
instance,  for  unconscious  priming  effects.
Here  I  argue  that  this  practice  requires
implicit  assumptions  about  subjective
measures of  awareness incompatible with
basic  models  of  categorization  under
uncertainty  (e.g.,  modern  signal-detection
and threshold theories). Most importantly,
it ignores the potential effects of response
bias.  Instead  of  taking  “not-seen”
judgments  literally,  they  would  better  be
employed in parametric experiments where
stimulus  visibility  is  manipulated
systematically, not accidentally. This would
allow  studying  qualitative  and  double
dissociations  between  measures  of
awareness and of stimulus processing per
se.
Highlights
 Examines  assumptions  underlying
"not-seen"  judgments  (NSJs)  in
masked priming
 argues that selecting only NSJ trials
for further analysis is unwarranted
 concludes  that  NSJs  cannot  be
interpreted in isolation
 recommends  continuous  measures
of visibility 
 such measures should be employed
in  qualitative  and  double
dissociations
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"Not-seen"  judgments  and  the  NSJ-
only procedure
Many psychophysical procedures are
bewilderingly  simple.  For  instance,  when
participants are asked to assign numbers to
their  subjective  impression  of  stimulus
magnitude (e.g., calling a very loud tone a
“10”), they can do this quite well, and even
most reliably when allowed to choose their
own  number  range.  Thus,  by  assembling
subjective  impressions  under  numerical
categories,  valid  psychophysical  scales  of
subjective  magnitude  can  be  constructed
and be used even for seemingly impossible
tasks, such as comparing the loudness of a
tone to the brightness of a light (Stevens,
1946; Gescheider, 1997). The simplicity of
this  procedure  is  deceptive,  though.  It  is
based  on  an  intricate  theory  of
psychophysical  scaling,  involving  the
mapping of physical properties to sensory
responses, sensory responses to subjective
magnitudes, and subjective magnitudes to
categorization  responses,  all  via  various
functional  relationships  (optimistically
termed  “psychophysical  laws”,  e.g.,
Weber's,  Ekman's,  and  Stevens';  for  an
introduction, see Gescheider, 1997).
Hence,  subjective  judgments  of
stimulus  strength  are  deeply  rooted  in
psychophysical theory, and they play a vital
role  in  many  areas  of  psychophysics.
Recently,  however,  some  studies  in  the
domain  of  unconscious  visual  perception
make use of subjective classifications in a
problematic  way.  In  a  first  step,  their
procedure requires participants to perform
a  rapid  response  to  a  target  stimulus,
followed by a  rating  of  the visibility  of  a
critical  stimulus  (e.g.,  a  masked  prime
preceding the  target)  as  either  “seen” or
“not seen”. In a second step, those trials
where  participants  made  “not-seen”
judgments  (NSJs) are  treated  in  isolation
from  those  that  received  any  higher
visibility  ratings,  and  are  interpreted  as
those trials where the critical stimulus was
“invisible” or “subliminal”. Nothing is wrong
with  the  first  step;  it  is  the  second  step
that  invites  confusion:  taking  the  “not-
seen”  judgments  literally  while
underestimating  the  complexity  of  the
underlying  categorization  process.  The
purpose of this paper is to point out that
this approach is incompatible with modern
psychophysical theorizing.
As  a  caveat,  note  that  I  will  not
summarily  argue  against  subjective
measures of  visual  awareness (Cheesman
& Merikle, 1984) or trial-to-trial  measures
of visibility (Snodgrass, Bernat, & Shevrin,
2004).  Many  proposals  have  been  made
how a direct measure of visual awareness
(e.g., a subjective visibility rating) can be
sampled  concurrently  with  an  indirect
measure  of  stimulus  processing  (e.g.,  a
priming effect) on a trial-by-trial basis (see
Sandberg,  Timmermans,  Overgaard,  &
Cleeremans,  2010,  for  a  comparison  of
different  techniques).1 For  instance,
Ramsøy and Overgaard (2004) propose a
perceptual  awareness  scale  (PAS) where
subjective  experience  of  the  prime  is
classified  as  "no  experience",  "brief
glimpse",  "almost  clear  experience",  or
"clear experience" on each trial.  Similarly,
post-trial wagering involves a monetary bet
on  whether  or  not  a  stimulus  was
presented  (Persaud,  McLeod,  &  Cowey,
2007) and seems to be highly correlated to
PAS  ratings  and  confidence  judgments
(Sandberg et  al.,  2010). I have no doubt
that  trial-to-trial  visibility  ratings  can  be
informative,  provided  that  the  dual-task
situation  doesn't  induce  too  much
interference  between  direct  and  indirect
tasks. What is of concern here is whether
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visibility ratings are fine-graded to be later
used as a continuous measure of visibility,
or whether participants are forced to use a
small number of visibility categories, one of
which is  interpreted in  isolation  from the
others  as  containing  the  "unconscious"
trials. While my examples all focus on the
visual  modality,  the  arguments  can  of
course  be  generalized  to  other  sensory
modalities,  memory  paradigms,  and  a
range of further research domains.
Following  the  terminology  by
Cheesman and Merikle (1984) and Reingold
and  Merikle  (1988)  for  masked-priming
studies, I will call the participant's attempt
to identify the critical stimulus or to rate its
visibility the direct task, as opposed to the
indirect  task that  measures  whether  the
critical stimulus has an impact on behavior
at all. Direct and indirect tasks give rise to
direct and indirect measures, for instance,
a prime visibility rating and a priming effect
in  response  times.  Objective direct
measures  involve  judgments  of  the
stimulus; they are called this way because
they  can  be  compared  with  stimulus
parameters (for instance, in the d' measure
of  signal  detection  theory).  Subjective
direct  measures  involve  judgments  of
perceptual  states  instead  of  stimulus
parameters.
Not-seen judgments in practice
Studies  differ  greatly  in  how much
information  they  retain  about  the
subjective  stimulus  ratings,  ranging  from
fine to coarse categorizations. On one end
of the spectrum are studies with very fine-
grained,  nearly  continuous  scales.  For
instance,  Sergent  and  Dehaene  (2004)
retain all 21 levels of their stimulus visibility
ratings, and Scott and Dienes (2008) use a
scale of familiarity ratings ranging from 0
to  100.  Most  studies  use  considerably
fewer  rating  categories.  Zeki  and  ffytche
(1998) employ four categories, including an
NSJ category labeled "There was no feeling
of something being there. A total guess".
Ramsøy  and  Overgaard  (2004)  also
advocate  four  categories,  with  an  NSJ
category  labeled  "No  experience".  Finally,
there  are  studies  that  use  only  two
categories (e.g., Lau & Passingham, 2006;
Ro,  2008;  Ro,  Singhal,  Breitmeyer,  &
Garcia,  2009),  an  NSJ  and  a  non-NSJ
category.2 More  importantly,  studies
interpret  the  NSJ  category  in  radically
different  ways.  Many  studies  compare
some  indirect  measure  of  stimulus
processing  across  different  categories  of
the  visibility  scale  to  find  out  how  the
indirect measure depends on visibility. Such
a correlational approach makes full use of
all the rating categories in all experimental
conditions and is obviously valid. In other
studies,  however,  the  NSJ  category  is
interpreted in isolation. Let's look at one of
those studies in some detail.
Ro  (2008)  investigated  the  role  of
visual  awareness  in  the  redundant  target
effect. The task was to reach for a single
target  stimulus  (appearing at  one of  two
locations) in the presence or absence of a
central  distractor  stimulus  appearing
simultaneously  and  expected  to  speed
responses.  Visibility  of  the  distractor  was
manipulated  by  a  pulse  of  transcranial
magnetic stimulation (TMS) above primary
visual cortex. After each reach, participants
had  "to  report  whether  or  not  they  had
perceived  the  additional  central  stimulus
that  was  presented  in  half  of  the  trials"
(i.e.,  a  two-category  visibility  judgment,
NSJ  or  non-NSJ,  of  the  distractor).3 Ro
observed that responses in the presence of
the  distractor  were  faster  than  in  its
absence, independent of whether TMS was
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applied.  Interestingly,  when  TMS  was
applied,  the  redundant-target  effect  was
the  same no matter  whether  participants
indicated that they had or hadn't seen the
stimulus. The crucial comparison thus was
between three types  of  trials  in  the TMS
condition:  Those  where  the  redundant
target was absent, and those where it was
present and participants reported to have
either  "perceived"  or  "not  perceived"  the
target.
Up to here,  everything is  fine:  the
response time effect in the indirect task is
basically  the  same  no  matter  how
participants  classify  the  visibility  of  the
critical stimulus in the direct task. At this
point,  however,  the  author  goes  on  to
interpret that classification in a one-to-one
correspondence  with  perceptual  states.
First,  he  defines  that  "this  [...]  response
was  used  to  sort  trials  into  aware  and
unaware responses" (p. 380). That this is
not mere lab lingo is made clear later: "[...]
these  stimulus-present,  but  unconscious
trials were phenomenologically identical to
the observer as the stimulus-absent trials"
(p. 381). This is a far-reaching conclusion
involving a whole series of assumptions: 1)
that the two rating categories correspond
to distinct perceptual states, 2) that one of
those states is equivalent to one with no
stimulation  at  all,  and  3)  that  the
correspondence is one-to-one in the sense
that  all  responses  falling  into  the  same
rating category indicate one and the same
perceptual state (equivalence classes). But
is it really valid to conclude that whenever
the NSJ category was chosen the trial looks
and feels like one with no stimulus at all?
The problem seems to be that the
NSJ category is interpreted not  in relation
to other rating categories, but  in isolation,
as indicating exactly what its label says: "I
did  not  perceive  the  stimulus".  However,
what  may  appear  as  a  mere
interpretational imprecision can have grave
consequences  spilling  over  into  data
analysis: In some studies, the authors first
record a visibility  rating for each trial  (or
person)  and  then  discard all  the  cases
where a non-NSJ rating was given, arguing
that in the remainder of cases the critical
stimulus was "unconscious". 
Two examples of this strategy come
from  studies  on  continuous  flash
suppression. In that paradigm, a masking
stimulus is repeatedly flashed to one eye.
When a target stimulus is then presented
to the other eye, it is measured how long it
takes  for  the  target  to  "break"  the  flash
suppression  by  the  mask  and  to  be
consciously  perceived  (Tsuchiya  &  Koch,
2005;  Feng  &  He,  2005).  Bahrami  et  al.
(2010)  used  this  technique  to  study  the
priming  of  numerosity  judgments  by
different  types  of  primes.  In  each
experiment,  several  participants  were
excluded on  the  basis  of  visibility  ratings
and other criteria. Then, in the remaining
participants,  only  those  trials  were
analyzed  where  participants  gave  an  NSJ
rating (exclusion rates ranged from 6 % to
36 % of trials, not counting those from the
excluded  participants).  The  stimuli
surviving  this  selection  procedure  were
termed  "invisible",  and  there  was  no
comparison  of  priming  effects  across
visibility  ratings.  Feng  and  He  (2005)
employed  a  similar  but  much  exclusive
selection  procedure  for  their  study  of
cortical  activation  by  flash-suppressed
object  pictures.  Even though they readily
identified  rating  categories  with  "visible"
and "invisible" stimuli, they provided a full
comparison  between  those  stimulus
classes.
In  some contrast  to  that,  Almeida,
Mahon, Nakayama, and Caramazza (2008)
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employed continuous flash suppression to
study  the  representation  of  object
categories in the ventral and dorsal visual
streams.  Targets were pictures  of  objects
or animals. To create target images of low
visibility, the authors used a pilot study to
select several levels of luminance contrast
for  the  target  image.  The  main  task
(categorization  of  the  target)  was
performed on all those contrast levels, and
then  a  separate  visibility  test  was
conducted to decide post hoc which of the
contrast  levels  would  be  selected  for
analysis. For each participant, the highest
contrast  level  was selected for  which the
participant's  discrimination  performance
was  not  different  from  chance  (a  rather
lenient 61-65 % of correct responses). All
contrast  levels  higher  than  that  were
discarded;  in  an  unreported  number  of
cases, entire participants were discarded. It
is  unclear  which  proportion  of  the  data
ultimately survived to be reported. Again,
there was no comparison of priming effects
across visibility ratings.
In the following, I will argue that the
practice  of  interpreting  one  response
category  in  isolation  from  the  others
(henceforth called the NSJ-only procedure)
requires  assumptions  incompatible  with
modern psychophysics and doesn't provide
a  sufficiently  solid  basis  for  claims  of
unconscious cognition. In a next step, I will
argue  that  at  the  heart  of  this  flawed
procedure  is  a  sampling  fallacy,  the
erroneous conviction that a restriction of a
sample  on  the  basis  of  measured
characteristics  is  still  valid  on  the
population level.
Threshold  theories:  From  distinct
states to distinct responses 
The  NSJ-only  procedure  aims  at
classifying  psychophysical  trials  by  the
perceptual  states  they  elicit.  Specifically,
the procedure tries to tell apart trials where
the stimulus was not consciously perceived
from those where at least some amount of
stimulus  awareness  was  experienced.
Because the procedure treats all the trials
resulting  in  NSJs  as  “unconscious”,  it
obviously  assumes  some  fairly  direct
mapping between the overt judgment and
the covert perceptual state.
In  other  words,  the  NSJ-only
procedure  assumes  that  the  critical
stimulus  elicits  one  of  two  perceptual
states (or classes of states), one where the
stimulus was not consciously perceived and
one  where  it  possibly  was.  Such  a  two-
state  concept  of  consciousness  is  the
hallmark of a threshold theory. Historically,
that  brand  of  theory  emerged  from
detection  and  discrimination  experiments
using  very  weak  stimuli  at  the  “absolute
threshold”  of  perception,  or  very  small
differences  between  stimuli  at  the
“discrimination  threshold”.  For  instance,
high-threshold  theory assumed  that
physical  stimuli  resulted  in  an  internal
stimulus representation characterized by a
certain  strength  or  magnitude.  If  the
stimulus  was  strong  enough,  its  internal
representation  exceeded  a  detection
threshold,  passing  the  observer  from  an
“undetect”  state  into  a  “detect”  state
where he could report the stimulus without
making  errors,  whereas  in  the  undetect
state only random guessing was possible.
In  contrast,  the  more  complex  low-
threshold theory assumed that both states
might  lead  to  response  errors.  Quickly,
those  simple  concepts  were  elaborated
further,  taking  into  account  spontaneous
variability in the stimulus representation as
well  as  variability  in  the  thresholds.
Importantly  for  our  purposes,  the
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development  of  those  models  was  driven
by  the  need  to  relate  observers'  overt
responses to their unobservable perceptual
states by analyzing the pattern of  errors.
One consequence of the threshold theories
was the development of elaborate guessing
models  explaining  how  correct  and
incorrect responses could occur out of the
detect,  undetect,  or  intermediary  states
(e.g., Atkinson & Kinchla, 1965; Friedman,
Carterette,  Nakatani,  &  Ahumada,  1968).
Thus, stimulus-absent responses were not
taken at  face  value,  but  were  subject  to
elaborate  correction  schemes  directly
following from the respective  theory.  Any
psychophysical  procedure  postulating
transitions between internal  states has to
face such complexity.
The  NSJ-only  procedure  requires  a
threshold  model  as  well,  but  while  the
classical  models  deal  with  the  observer's
ability  to  classify  external  stimuli  (an
objective  measure),  the  NSJ-only
procedure requires the observer to classify
internal states (a subjective measure). An
objective procedure  would  compare
“stimulus-present”  and  “stimulus-absent”
judgments across trials where the stimulus
actually  was  or  wasn't  presented.  In  an
objective  procedure,  the  observer  may
declare a stimulus present when it is in fact
absent  (a  false  alarm)  or  vice  versa  (a
miss),  or  she  may  correctly  identify  a
stimulus  as  present  (a  hit)  or  absent  (a
correct  rejection).  In  a  subjective
procedure  involving  NSJs,  her  response
may  indicate  an  unconscious  state  when
she is in fact in the conscious state (a false
alarm),  or vice versa (a miss),  or  it  may
correctly indicate the unconscious state (a
hit) or conscious state (a correct rejection).
Signal  detection:  Categorizing  the
continuous
In  contrast  to  threshold  theory,
signal-detection  theory  (SDT)  does  not
assume that the internal perceptual states
elicited by a stimulus are distinct (Green &
Swets,  1966;  Macmillan  &  Creelman,
2005).  There  are  no  “detect”  and
“undetect” states at all. Instead, the theory
assumes  that  stimuli  create  internal
representations that are subject to chance
fluctuations  (random  noise)  and  that
categorical judgments about those internal
distributions are based on decision criteria.
When attempting to detect a stimulus, the
observer  tries  to  decide  whether  the
internal evidence in favor of the stimulus is
more  likely  to  come  from  a  statistical
distribution of  signal  plus noise  (S+N) or
from a distribution of noise alone (N). This
is done by employing a criterion that would
be  suited  for  separating  the  two
overlapping distributions. If the subjective
evidence  exceeds  the  criterion,  the  S+N
distribution  is  favored  over  the  N
distribution  because  it  is  more  likely  to
have  generated  this  particular  level  of
subjective  evidence  for  the  stimulus.4
Importantly, SDT recognizes a need for a
subsequent  step,  namely  translating  the
decision  process  into  an  appropriate
response  (e.g.,  “stimulus  present”,
“stimulus  absent”).  Under  this  theory,
mistakes occur  because trials  from the  N
distribution  (where  no  stimulus  was
presented) sometimes exceed the decision
threshold  (resulting  in  false  alarms),  and
because  trials  from  the  S+N distribution
sometimes  fail  to  reach  the  criterion
(resulting in misses).
When  employed  as  an  objective
measure of stimulus detection, SDT is able
to  distinguish  an  observer's  ability  to
actually  separate  the  N and  S+N
distributions  (the  sensitivity)  from  his  or
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her  propensity  to  declare  a  stimulus
present  or  absent  (the  response  bias).
Specifically, bringing observers to adopt a
stricter criterion lowers the false-alarm rate
at the expense of the hit rate, whereas a
more  lenient  criterion  raises  both  false-
alarm and hit rates. When employed as a
subjective measure  of  visibility,  SDT
provides  a  framework  for  explaining  how
stimulus  representations  of  different
strengths  can  be  sorted  into  visibility
ratings  by  means  of  a  set  of  decision
criteria. Here, sensitivity would reflect the
observer's  ability  to  accurately  categorize
his or her perceptual state, and response
bias would reflect the overall propensity to
choose a specific category.
Interpreting NSJ trials in isolation
Let's  use the theoretical  arsenal  of
threshold and detection theories to analyze
a  simple  application  of  the  NSJ-only
procedure. In principle, the procedure can
be applied to experiments where the same
weak  stimulus  is  presented  again  and
again,  and  participants  are  required  to
declare it  present or  absent in each new
trial.5 He  has  to  his  disposal  a  set  of
response  categories  that  are  somehow
labeled to reflect an ordered set of states
of  subjective  stimulus  visibility,  with  the
lowest  rating  labeled  “I  am  absolutely
certain  that  no  stimulus  whatsoever  was
presented”  (our  NSJ  category).  The NSJ-
only procedure now proceeds in collecting
trials  where  the  NSJ  response  is  given,
discarding  all  those  trials  with  higher
visibility ratings, and continuing to analyze
the  isolated  NSJ  trials  for  evidence  of
indirect effects of stimulus processing (e.g.,
priming effects).
From both  theoretical  perspectives,
threshold and signal-detection theory,  the
shortcomings  of  the  NSJ-only  procedure
become very clear in the case of constant
stimulation.  Let's  start  with  the  threshold
account. The procedure implicitly follows a
threshold  model  assuming  that  the
observer was in a distinct perceptual state
in  all  those  trials  that  resulted  in  NSJs,
namely a state where the stimulus was not
consciously  perceived.  Therefore,  it  faces
the  very  same  problems  as  the  classical
threshold theories, and it would require the
same arsenal of error corrections. However,
it is unable to identify the correct threshold
model because hits,  false alarms, misses,
and  correct  rejections  are  genuinely
unobservable due to the subjective nature
of  the  classification  task.  Therefore,  no
guessing correction is applied. Instead, all
variance  in  the  responses  is  directly
attributed to  a  spontaneous flipping back
and forth between two perceptual  states,
"conscious" and "unconscious".
How  would  signal-detection  theory
account for response behavior in this kind
of  experiment?  SDT  would  assume  a
continuum of perceptual states, resulting in
some  amount  of  subjective  evidence  for
the  critical  stimulus.  Response  categories
would be chosen by means of an ordered
set  of  response  criteria.  NSJs  would  be
made  whenever  the  evidence  for  the
stimulus  fails  to  exceed  a  criterion
separating  the  lowermost  NSJ  category
from the next-higher  one.  If  an observer
would change that criterion, her likelihood
of giving NSJs would increase or decrease,
thus being subject to response bias as well
as  sensitivity.  However,  because  the
observer  is  trying  to  classify  perceptual
states instead of external stimuli, the NSJ-
only procedure is actually unable to assess
the  observers'  sensitivity,  that  is,  the
likelihood that NSJs are really made from
the “unconscious” state, as opposed from
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any different state. Neither does it account
for  the  observer's  response  bias,  that  is,
the overall propensity for choosing the NSJ
category.  It  doesn't  account  for  the
possibility  that  observers  have  to  choose
the NSJ category under uncertainty, that is,
under  the  danger  of  misclassifying  their
perceptual  state  into  adjacent  response
categories (giving an NSJ by false alarm, or
failing to give it by a miss). In fact, under
invariant  stimulation,  sensitivity  and  bias
cannot be told apart at all. In this situation,
the  NSJ-only  procedure  is  running  the
danger  of  capitalizing  on  chance
fluctuations in  either  perceptual  states  or
response criteria by declaring any change
in responses a change in “visibility”.6
This  situation  is  essentially
unchanged  if  we  assume  a  variety  of
stimuli or stimulus conditions. Of course, if
different  stimuli  are  employed  but
presented  in  blocks,  the  problems  are
essentially  the  same  as  under  constant
stimulation.  But  even  if  stimuli  are
randomized across trials, this merely adds
another source of variance to the existing
structure  of  different  response  criteria
established  for  the  different  response
categories. In other words, there will  still
be false alarms and misses when selecting
the NSJ category, but they will  arise from
variance  in  the  stimuli  on  top  of  the
variance  in  perceptual  states  or  response
criteria.  Of  course,  the  presentation  of
multiple  stimuli  is  an  advantage  over
constant stimulation because it  allows for
separation  of  sensitivity  and  bias  in
stimulus  classification,  that  is,  in  an
objective  measure  of  stimulus
discriminability. But it still doesn't allow for
separating  those  two  variables  in
perceptual state classification, that is, the
subjective measure of stimulus visibility.
Multilevel decision models
I  have  argued  that  the  NSJ-only
procedure  is  incompatible  with  basic
assumptions of threshold as well as signal
detection  theory.  Those  problems  are
illustrated  by  two  recent  theories  of  NSJ
judgments that lead to  multilevel decision
models. I think that both theories support
my argument against the unguarded use of
NSJ categories because they both point out
the  difficulties  of  inferring  internal
subjective  states  from  overt  statements
about those states.
For Dienes (2008), what seems like
unconscious  knowledge  is  just  a
discrepancy  between  decision  criteria  at
different  stages:  a  "first-order",
phenomenal  stage where the system can
be  in  a  set  of  confidence  states,  and  a
"higher-order"  stage  that  represents  how
the  participant  classifies  ("thinks  about")
the  first-order  states.  If  the  higher-order
stage has a stricter criterion for declaring
the system to be in a "guess" state, there
is a gap in classifications where the system
"knows  something"  on  one  level,  but
doesn't  "know it  knows  something"  on  a
higher level. For example, Scott and Dienes
(2008) investigate the learning of artificial
grammars. In each trial, participants have
to  indicate  whether  a  letter  string  is
grammatical  or  ungrammatical  (with
reference to a grammar picked up in the
training  phase),  how  familiar  the  string
feels,  and  the  confidence  in  the
grammaticality  decision.  Confidence  is
rated  in  four  categories,  depending  on
whether  the  decision  was based on  pure
guessing  (the  NSJ  category),  an  intuition
about the correct answer, a rule that has
been discovered, or memory. The authors
found  that  learner's  grammaticality
judgments  were  predicted  by  familiarity
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judgments,  even when confidence ratings
indicated  they  were  guessing.  In  their
model of confidence judgments, Scott and
Dienes  propose  that  both  confidence
judgments  and  grammaticality  judgments
are based on the same underlying source
of information, a feeling of familiarity. Over
the  course  of  an  experiment,  learners
compare  familiarity  for  a  new  item  with
respect to the mean of the distribution of
familiarity levels encountered so far. If this
difference  fails  to  exceed  a  positive  or
negative confidence threshold, participants
claim  to  be  guessing  even  though  their
grammaticality  judgments  may  be  better
than chance. If the difference exceeds the
confidence  threshold,  then  grammaticality
judgments  are  made  with  increasing
accuracy as well as increasing confidence.
This is an interesting approach, but
any claim for unconscious learning entirely
depends on the authors' "gap argument":
the  range  of  familiarity  judgments  below
the confidence threshold that still predicts
grammaticality  judgments.  I  wonder
whether this gap is an inevitable artifact of
comparing  a  nearly  continuous  familiarity
scale  with  a  coarse,  four-category
confidence  scale.  If  more  confidence
ratings were used, it is likely that the gap
would become smaller, that is, NSJs would
be restricted to smaller familiarity ratings.
(At the same time, the correlation between
familiarity  and  grammaticality  judgments
would  tend  to  disappear  because  of  the
decreasing  variance  of  familiarity  ratings
below  the  ever-stricter  confidence
threshold.)
A similar  proposal  comes from Lau
(2008). He argues for a two-level model of
signal detection -- the lower level involving
the  internal  signal  distributions  for
stimulus-present and stimulus-absent trials,
and  the  higher  level  involving
representations of  those  internal  signal
distributions.  The  idea  is  that  the  higher
level  might  misrepresent  the  lower-level
distributions,  prompting  the  observer  to
use  a  misleading  decision  criterion  (see
Lau, 2008, for an explanation of blindsight
as a consequence of a mistaken criterion
setting). 
The Dienes (2008) and Lau (2008)
proposals  share  the  same problem:  They
put several decision problems in series, one
plugged  into  another,  with  little  hope  of
identifying  process  parameters  at  the
lowest level. In Dienes's model, first-order
states  are  freshly  partitioned  by  a  new,
unknown set of decision criteria. In Lau's
model, the type of evidence on which NSJs
are based is an unknown function of the
first-order  subjective  evidence.  In  fact,
even  though  both  authors  advocate  the
use of  rather  coarse subjective  measures
with  NSJ  categories,  their  multilevel
decision theories cast additional doubt on
the  NSJ-only  procedure  because  they
basically  state  that  the  "true",  first-order
subjective states are not in  a  one-to-one
correspondence  with  overt  classification
behavior.
The NSJ-only procedure as a sampling
fallacy
The  NSJ-only  procedure  shares
many  features  with  a  more  obvious
malpractice  in  consciousness  research,
namely  to  measure  identification
performance  for  the  critical  stimulus  in
each participant and then to discard those
participants  who perform above a certain
criterion,  claiming that  for  the remainder,
the  stimulus  was  unconscious  (Schmidt,
Haberkamp,  &  Schmidt,  2011).  For
example,  Cheadle,  Parton,  Müller,  and
Usher (2011) claimed that subliminal 50-Hz
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flicker  at  one  of  three  spatial  positions
would  enhance  target  processing  at  that
location  by  attracting  visual  attention.  In
each of three experiments, they discarded
those  participants  that  performed  above
40% correct target detections so that the
remaining group was no longer significantly
better  than  chance,  thereby  disregarding
the data of 4 out of 26, 4 out of 17, 3 out
of 14, and 3 out of 11 participants in the
various  experiments  and  conditions.  (For
further discussion of this attentional effect,
see  Bauer,  Cheadle,  Parton,  Müller,  &
Usher,  2009;  but  also  van  Diepen,  Born,
Souto, Gauch, & Kerzel, 2010.)
It  should  be  evident  that  such  a
procedure capitalizes on chance differences
between  participants.  However,  I  think
there  is  a  deeper  misunderstanding
involved about the nature of sampled data:
Restricting the sample to only the NSJ trials
does  not affect the actual visibility of the
stimuli,  which  is  indicated  jointly by  the
NSJ  and  non-NSJ  trials.  This  is  why  I
believe the NSJ-only procedure is based on
a  sampling  fallacy,  namely  the  conviction
that a restriction of the sample is somehow
still  valid at  the population level.  In fact,
selecting  only  those  participants  or  trials
that  meet  some  visibility  criterion  is
analogous to testing a new medication and
then discarding all those patients who die
from  it,  concluding  that  all  "suitable"
patients do fine under the new drug.
Inconveniences and absurdities
Historically, the study of unconscious
perception  has  met  with  a  lot  of
methodological  criticism.  Traditionally,
unconscious perception is demonstrated by
showing  that  a  critical  stimulus  is  below
some strict criterion in a direct measure of
conscious  visibility,  while  still  provoking
some  nonzero  effects  in  an  indirect
measure  like  priming.  Critics  such  as
Eriksen (1960), Holender (1986; Holender
&  Duscherer,  2004),  and  others  have
attacked  studies  using  this  logic  for  not
presenting  any  evidence  meeting
sufficiently  strict  criteria.  For  example,  in
his  landmark  paper,  Marcel  (1983)
arbitrarily set a discrimination performance
of 60 % in the direct measure as a valid
criterion for declaring the critical  stimulus
unconscious  (where  chance  performance
would  be  at  50  %).  But  is  60  % strict
enough? Would 55 % be sufficient, or 51,
or 50.1?
One  major  problem  with  the  NSJ-
only procedure is that it can lead to absurd
conclusions  about  unconscious  processing
even when the critical stimulus is far from
invisible  by  traditional  standards.  For
instance,  consider  once  more  a  situation
where  the  same  weak  stimulus  is
presented on each trial,  and assume that
the observer uses the NSJ category in 50
%  of  trials  (thus  exactly  meeting  the
traditional detection threshold). The proper
conclusion would be that the observer is in
some specified state of  uncertainty about
the stimulus, not in a state of oblivion. Yet,
the  NSJ-only  procedure  would  happily
continue  to  analyze  the  50  %  of
"subliminal"  trials,  ignoring  the  rest.  We
can continue this argument by considering
smaller  and  smaller  percentages  of  NSJ
judgments. For instance, if the proportion
of  NSJs  would  be  as  low  as  10  %,  we
would certainly conclude that the stimulus
is  far  above  the  detection  threshold,  yet
the NSJ-only procedure would still invite us
to analyze the few NSJ trials for effects of
unconscious perception.
The  NSJ-only  procedure  is  clearly
oblivious to the historical need of the field
to  proceed  with  exceptionally  stringent
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criteria of visibility. It also lacks specifics on
how it is to be applied. We have just seen
that when the percentage of NSJs is low, it
is  no  longer  convincing  to  argue  for
invisibility  in  single  trials,  so  that  an
objective performance criterion may still be
necessary on top of subjective judgments
--  begging  the  question,  which  one?
Another open issue is the number of rating
categories,  because  it  is  quite  likely  that
the percentage of NSJs will depend on the
number of categories available (Ramsøy &
Overgaard,  2004).  Imagine  a  detection
experiment  where  twenty  categories  of
prime  visibility  are  used,  and  only  the
lowest one is  the NSJ category.  Compare
this  with  an  experiment  where  only  the
categories "seen" and "not seen" are used.
It is likely that the availability of only two
rating  categories  will  be  an  incentive  for
using  the  NSJ  category  more  often.
Related, how should visibility categories be
labeled?  It  is  likely  that  the  specific
wording  of  the  NSJ  and  its  adjacent
categories  will  affect  the  decision  criteria
separating  those  categories,  especially
when the NSJ label assumes the character
of a "leading question".
Finally,  the  NSJ-only  procedure  is
inefficient because it draws on information
from only a small percentage of trials. For
instance, if stimulus-present and stimulus-
absent  conditions  were  intermixed  in  a
detection  experiment,  the  NSJ-only
procedure would ignore all of the stimulus-
absent trials as well as all those stimulus-
present trials  where no NSJs were given.
Generally,  if  NSJs  are  produced  in  a
proportion  r of  stimulus-present  trials
occurring with probability p, the procedure
uses  only  a  proportion  r∙p of  all  the
available  trials.  For  instance,  if  there  are
equal  proportions of  stimulus-present and
stimulus-absent trials, and NSJs are made
in 30 % of the stimulus-present trials, then
the NSJ-only procedure discards 85 % of
the data.
Alternatives:  Qualitative  and  double
dissociations
Currently,  most  approaches  for
demonstrating  unconscious  cognition  aim
to  show  that  a  direct  measure  of  visual
awareness is near chance while an indirect
measure  of  visual  processing  is  above
chance. In other words, a stimulus must be
shown  to  be  "invisible"  (inaudible,
unremembered) yet still yield some indirect
effect on another measure (e.g., a priming
effect  in  reaction  times).  This  pattern  of
data  constitutes  a  simple  dissociation
between  direct  and  indirect  measures
(Schmidt & Vorberg, 2006). The trouble is
that from a psychophysical and a statistical
point of view, it  cannot be proven that a
stimulus was invisible -- it can at best be
made  plausible.  Reingold  and  Merikle
(1988)  were the first  to  argue that  even
when  prime  identification  performance  is
exactly at chance in a strict objective test,
this  does  not  yet  imply  invisibility  of  the
stimulus unless the measurement process
is  exhaustive  with respect to all conscious
information  in  the  prime  --  that  is,  the
direct measure must be able to detect any
change,  however  small,  in  conscious
awareness.  Schmidt  and  Vorberg  (2006)
show  that  an  exhaustive  measure  is  a
strictly  monotonic  function  of  visibility,
which  means  it  must  be  of  unlimited
sensitivity  --  clearly  a  daunting
requirement.7
This  difficulty  persists  when
subjective  measures  of  visibility  are  used
instead  of  objective  measures  based  on
prime  identification  performance.  Dienes
(2008)  suggests  two  criteria  for
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unconscious  cognition,  both  based  on
subjective  measures:  a  guessing  criterion
which separates NSJs from non-NSJs, and
a  zero-correlation criterion, which consists
of  demonstrating  that  participants'
confidence  is  unrelated  to  their  objective
performance.  Both  criteria  give  valuable
information  not  otherwise  obtained  from
objective  measures,  but  they  are  both
based on a simple-dissociation  logic.  The
guessing criterion needs to be exhaustive
in  the  sense  that  participants  must  be
accurate in classifying their internal states
--  an  ability  that  Dienes  (2008)  himself
doubts  in  his  two-level  theory.  The zero-
correlation  criterion  is  even  more
problematic  because  it  requires
exhaustiveness  in  two measures,  the
subjective and the objective one.
However,  Merikle  and  Cheesman
(1987)  outlined a  way to circumvent  this
measurement  problem by  introducing  the
concept  of  qualitative  dissociations. A
qualitative  dissociation  is  a  data  pattern
where  an  indirect  measure  of  perception
(e.g.,  priming)  behaves  qualitatively
differently on different levels of the direct
measure  (e.g.,  visibility).  As  an  example,
Merikle and Joordens (1997) used a variant
of  the  Stroop  (1935)  task  where
participants responded to the color of red
or  green  target  stimuli  preceded  by  the
prime  words  “RED”  or  “GREEN”.  The
regular  Stroop  effect  features  faster
responses  in  consistent  trials  (where  the
prime word agrees  with  the  color  of  the
target) than in inconsistent trials. However,
when  the  majority  of  primes  are
inconsistent with the target,  it  is  possible
that  participants  adjust  their  response
strategies  and  become  faster  in
inconsistent  than  in  consistent  trials.
Interestingly,  the  authors  found  this
strategic  reversal  only  under  conditions
where the prime was well visible; when the
primes were strongly masked, no reversal
occurred.  They concluded that  processing
was qualitatively different under conditions
of low and high visibility, respectively.
More generally, if we let awareness
vary across experimental conditions, it may
be  possible  to  establish  a  double
dissociation,  which  consists  in  finding  an
experimental  manipulation  that  changes
direct  and  indirect  measures  in  opposite
directions (Schmidt & Vorberg, 2006).8 For
example, a prime-target sequence can lead
to  response  priming  effects  in  reaction
times  (Klotz  &  Neumann,  1999;  Klotz  &
Wolff,  1995) that increase with increasing
time  interval  between  prime  and  target
onset (Vorberg, Mattler, Heinecke, Schmidt,
&  Schwarzbach,  2003).  However,  this
increase in priming effects is independent
of  whether  the  prime  becomes  more or
less visible  with  increasing  prime-target
interval: The increase in priming is always
the  same,  no  matter  whether  prime
visibility  is  low  or  high,  and  no  matter
whether it is increasing or decreasing with
increasing prime-target interval (Vorberg et
al., 2003; Mattler, 2003; Albrecht, Klapötke,
& Mattler, 2010).9 It is intuitively clear that
if a direct and an indirect measure of prime
processing proceed in opposite directions,
they cannot both be explained by a single,
monotonic source of conscious information
about  the  prime (for  mathematical  proof,
see Schmidt & Vorberg, 2006).10
From  a  measurement-theoretical
point  of  view,  double  dissociations  have
many  advantages  and  many  surprising
features (see Schmidt & Vorberg, 2006, for
proofs  and  details).  Firstly,  they  are
obtained  by  varying  the  visibility  of  the
prime  systematically,  not  accidentally,  in
parametric  experiments.  They  do  not
require  and  cannot  be  obtained  under
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conditions  of  zero  visibility  of  the  prime.
Secondly,  they  work  under  milder
measurement  assumptions  than  the
traditional  zero-awareness  criterion;  in
particular,  they  require  no  exhaustiveness
assumption.  They  therefore  lead  to  the
surprising  conclusion  that  unconscious
stimuli are neither necessary nor desirable
for demonstrating unconscious processing.
In  another  demonstration  of  a
double  dissociation,  we  used  a  visual
lightness  illusion  (Adelson,  1993)  in
conjunction with  a  response priming task
(Schmidt,  Miksch, Bulganin,  Jäger,  Lossin,
Jochum,  &  Kohl,  2010).  Participants
responded to a  pair  of  targets,  one light
and  one dark,  by  pressing  a  key  on  the
side  of  the  lighter  target.  Immediately
preceding  the  targets  was  a  pair  of
flankers,  one  light  and  one  dark,  with  a
spatial  arrangement  consistent  or
inconsistent with that of the targets. Under
control  conditions,  those  flankers  induced
strong response priming effects, with faster
responses  in  consistent  and  slower
responses  in  inconsistent  trials.  Under
illusion conditions, however, the physically
more  luminant  flanker  could  be  made  to
appear  either  lighter  or  darker  than  the
physically less luminant flanker. Under such
conditions,  we found that  priming effects
always  depended  on  the  local  luminance
contrast  of  the  flankers,  not  on  how the
flankers  were  consciously  perceived.  In
particular, a flanker could look lighter than
the  other  flanker,  but  prime as  if  it  was
darker (and vice versa). We concluded that
rapid  motor  output  was  based  on  a
qualitatively  different  stimulus
representation  than  brightness  judgments
based on visual awareness. 
That  study  illustrates  how  double
dissociations could go beyond the simple-
dissociation  paradigm. First,  no "invisible"
stimuli  were  needed  to  dissociate  visual
awareness  from  rapid  motor  activation:
The  flankers  were  highly  visible  and
remained  on  screen  unmasked  until  the
participant  had  responded.  Second,  the
dissociation  reveals  and  is  driven  by  a
qualitative  difference  between  conscious
and unconscious perception, going beyond
a  mere  existence  proof  of  unconscious
processing.
Conclusions
The NSJ-only procedure purports to
provide  a  simple  solution  to  the  difficult
measurement  problem  of  proving  a
stimulus  invisible  or  "subliminal".11 But  it
doesn't deliver -- it just softens the criteria
that for skeptics were never strict enough
to begin with. Its limitations are revealed
by psychophysical standard models, both of
the threshold and the signal detection type.
My  conclusion  is  that  subjective  visibility
judgments  are  simply  not  suited  for
artificial  dichotomies  truthfully  separating
"conscious" from "unconscious" processing.
The  prima  facie validity  of  such
dichotomies solely stems from the fact that
those  category  labels  bear  suggestive
names, not because they are theoretically
justified.  Of  course,  this  doesn't  render
subjective  measures  of  visibility  useless:
They  can  give  indispensable  information
about  conscious  perception  if  they  are
sufficiently fine-grained and, importantly, if
single  rating  categories  are  never
interpreted  in  isolation  from  other
categories.  The  selective,  isolated  use  of
only a single rating category (or any other
subsample of the dataset) is a distortion of
the sample. 
Instead  of  taking  “not-seen”
judgments  literally,  they  would  better  be
employed in parametric experiments where
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stimulus  visibility  is  manipulated
systematically, not accidentally. This would
allow  studying  qualitative  and  double
dissociations  between  measures  of
awareness and of stimulus processing per
se, going beyond mere existence proofs of
unconscious  processing  and  toward
discovering  the  qualitative  differences
between  conscious  and  unconscious
perception.
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Footnotes
1 The  preference  for  subjective  or
objective  measures  is  in  danger  of
becoming ideological. For instance, Dienes
(2008)  strongly  advocates  the  use  of
subjective  measures,  claiming  that
objective  measures  were  promoted  by
people  skeptical  about  unconscious
perception  in  order  to  dismiss  the
hypothesis of unconscious perception more
easily.  How  little  is  gained  from  such
polemic is illustrated by the author's own
introductory  example,  the  blindsight
phenomenon,  which  consists  of  a
dissociation  between a subjective  and an
objective  measure.  If  researchers  would
exclusively  apply  subjective  measures,
blindsight  would  never  have  been
discovered.
2 Note  that  Sergent  and  Dehaene
(2004) argue for a dichotomy of conscious
and  unconscious  states  on  the  basis  of
their data, but nevertheless try to obtain a
fine-grained visibility measure. Importantly,
they  do  not  force  participants  to  use  a
"not-seen"  rating  category.  Ramsøy  and
Overgaard  (2004)  have  a  somewhat
incoherent  position:  They  strongly  argue
against subjective measures involving only
two  visibility  classes,  but  seem  perfectly
content  with  their  similarly  coarse
classification into four visibility classes.
3 From  this  description  of  the
participants'  instructions,  it  is  not entirely
clear what the exact instructions were and
whether  they  entailed  any  information
about  the  likelihood  of  stimulus-present
and stimulus-absent trials.
4 Exposition here is for a detection
experiment, but it can be easily generalized
to a discrimination experiment. Just replace
the N and S+N distributions with S1 and S2
distributions,  and  change  the  subjective
categorization  scale  to  one with  poles  of
"clearly  saw  that  S1 was  presented"  and
"clearly saw that  S2 was presented", with
the NSJ category in the center.
5 This  might  seem  like  an  odd
technique  to  many,  but  I  have  seen  it
employed  in  several  submitted
manuscripts. The method is advocated in a
short reply paper by Desender and van den
Bussche  (2012).  Note  that  studying
fluctuations in awareness despite constant
stimulation  is  at  the  heart  of  many
interesting  phenomena,  for  example,
binocular  rivalry,  motion  aftereffects,  and
the autokinetic effect.
6 Because  the  NSJ-only  procedure
may  capitalize  on  chance  fluctuations  in
stimulus representations, it  might miss or
even  suppress  a  possible  dissociation.
When a prime is classified as "unconscious"
only  because it  happens to have a weak
stimulus representation, chances are that it
will also produce a weak indirect effect in a
priming task. So, direct and indirect effects
may  become  correlated  because  of  a
confounding  variable,  representation
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strength, which fluctuates across trials and
affects both measures.
7 Reingold and Merikle (1988) state
a second criterion, namely that the direct
measure must be exclusive with respect to
conscious information, that is, must not be
influenced by any unconscious information.
From our formalization, this requirement is
not  necessary.  However,  if  the  indirect
measure  was  exclusive  with  respect  to
unconscious  information,  this  would  be  a
sufficient condition for interpreting a simple
dissociation  as  evidence  for  unconscious
processing  (Schmidt  &  Vorberg,  2006).
Personally,  I  am not  optimistic  about  the
exhaustiveness criterion, but argue that in
some  tasks  fast  motor  measures  of
stimulus  processing might  turn out  to  be
exclusive  measures  of  unconscious
processing (Schmidt, 2007).
8 Mathematically,  Merikle  and
Joorden's  qualitative  dissociation  is  a
special  case  of  Schmidt  and  Vorberg's
double  dissociation  (see  our  paper  for  a
proof).
9 This  is  true  under  standard
conditions,  where  only  two  stimuli  are
involved and prime visibility  is  altered by
visual  backward  masking  from  the
subsequent target (e.g., by metacontrast).
It is not true when visibility is controlled by
degrading  the  prime  stimulus  itself  (e.g.,
lowering its energy or contrast), and it gets
more  complicated  when  an  additional
masking  stimulus  intervenes  between
prime  and  target  (Lingnau  &  Vorberg,
2005).
10 “Monotonic”  (precisely,  “weakly
monotonic”)  means  that  in  the  long  run
(i.e.,  the expected values), an increase in
the  information  source  cannot  lead  to  a
decrease  in  the  attached  measure.  This
assumption  is  necessary  for  any  sensible
measurement  process.  Dunn  and  Kirsner
(1988) show that without this assumption,
double dissociations cannot be interpreted
as unequivocal evidence for more than one
underlying  process.  They instead propose
an even more intricate dissociation pattern
named  “reversed  association”.  Under
assumptions  of  weak  monotonicity,  it  too
becomes  a  special  case  of  a  double
dissociation.
11 Many  authors  prefer  the  term
subliminal when  referring  to  purportedly
unconscious  stimuli.  That  term  already
implies a threshold model. It also seems to
stress  the  strongly  misleading  idea  that
conscious visibility of a stimulus is primarily
a  function  of  its  physical  strength.  But
some  of  the  most  effective  methods  to
render a stimulus invisible do not reduce its
energy  at  all  (e.g.,  backward  masking,
inattentional  blindness).  In  turn,  actually
reducing  a  prime's  energy  will  typically
reduce  priming  as  well  (Haberkamp,
Schmidt,  &  Schmidt,  2013;  Schmidt,
Niehaus,  &  Nagel,  2006;  Schmidt  &
Schmidt, 2013; Vath & Schmidt, 2007; also
see  Schmidt,  Haberkamp,  &  Schmidt,
2011).
